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This paper presents a varicty of lessons for govcrnments of developing countries about how to begin to operate as new oil  
producers in the world petroleum market. Lessons, drawn from the recent experiences of currently producing LDCs, arc 
idcntified for each stage of thc industry from exploratioii and development through procurcrnent and bupply to  refining 
and marketing. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Unlcss we learn from the crrors of the past we are 
doomed to repeat them. This is especially true in 
the international oil business, where every year 
billions (lo9) of dollars hinge on correctly extra- 
polating from past trends to bet on the shape of 
the future. 
While this is perfectly sound advice, to which 
particular facts from the broad storehouse of the 
petroleum past should attention be paid? Also, 
how can one learn about the workings of the 
world oil market when one has not had direct 
experience operating in it? 
The need to discern lessons about the oil 
business is critically important for developing 
countries that possess petroleum resources but 
which lack much. or any. experience of exploiting 
them. The pronounced volatility in the price of 
oil, the radical shift in bargaining power between 
international oil companies and host govern- 
ments, and the many choices of contract terms, 
taxation arrangements and sources of capital can 
present inexperienced developing countries' oil 
producers with a bewildering array of policy 
choices. How can such countries distil lessons 
about this industry's operations so separated by 
time, geography and vastly changing market 
conditions? 
This paper outlines a variety of lessons about 
the operation of the world oil market for govern- 
ments of developing countries that are new 
producers and those with strong prospects to 
become producers in the future. We structure our 
analysis of the problems posed by oil develop- 
ment in terms of the vertical organization of the 
petroleum industry (where wellhead activities 
constitute the extreme upstream stage and retail 
activities constitute the extreme downstream 
stage), rather than in terms of broad operational 
issues such as financial policies, legal frameworks, 
etc. Moreover, instead of concentrating on only 
one vertical stage we describe what to do, and 
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what not to do, for each major stage, from 
exploration and development, to procurement 
and supply and to refining and marketing. 
The task we undertake is especially critical as 
the oil market moves into the late-1980s and 
early-l990s, which promise to be as risky and 
uncertain as the previous decadc.’ The wide price 
and production swings, coupled with the emerg- 
ence of both new factors and new transactional 
arrangements, means that in devising oil develop- 
ment strategies LDC government officials must 
be extremely circumspect, yet also bold and 
innovative. By circumspect we mean checking 
carefully the most promising options before 
acting; by bold, moving quickly and decisively 
once a strategy is selected; and by innovative, 
developing policies that not only respond to, but 
also anticipate, changes in the market. Moreover, 
because the past has been so tumultuous, earlier 
putative lessons are not necessarily applicable 
today. In other words, the relevant ‘lessons’ have 
changed as the structure of the market has 
changed and as the factors in the market have 
responded to such changes. In the current en- 
vironment, financial as well as operational rela- 
tionships are becoming increasingly .complex. 
This is true in the interactions between the public 
and private sector factors. in general, and be- 
tween the international oil companies (IOCs), 
LDC national oil companies (NOCs) and multi- 
lateral international organizations such as the 
World Bank, in particular. 
Our analysis of many LDCs experiences leads 
us to one inescapable conclusion: a large number 
of countries have failed to capitalize on valuablc 
market opportunities-in terms of expenditures 
as well as investmcnts-becausc of poor policy 
choices. The result, in some cases, has been 
substantial losses-in both an ‘out-of-pocket’ and 
an ‘opportunity cost’ sense. The kind of review 
we provide here therefore has practical signifi- 
cance. 
If there is a principal lesson we would stress it is 
that many, if not most, LDC NOCs-and their 
supervisory ministries-have not responded suffi- 
ciently quickly to the changing nature of the 
world oil market. Business practices and decision- 
making processes designed for an earlier time 
when the market was less competitive are now 
inefficient and costly. Moreover, no longer is the 
market highly vertically integrated and predict- 
able. 
Because of these changes it is necessary to 
derive lessons in the context of the petroleum 
industry as a wholc. This ‘all-industry’ perspective 
is especially useful to LDC government decision- 
makcrs for two reasons. First, LDC governments 
are typically responsible for monitoring domestic 
operations of the entire industry, even if they do 
not directly control or own any part of it. Second, 
one of the most important lessons of the 1970s 
and early-1980s is that policy actions targeted at 
one level of the industry may have unintended 
and deleterious consequences for other levels. 
For example, price controls on sales at the 
refinery gate, imposed for political and social 
reasons. may retard upstream investment in 
exploration and development. Similarly, a regula- 
tory strategy specific to exploration and develop- 
ment activities could well distort consumer wel- 
fare at the retail level. Thus, LDC governments 
need to be sensitive to the implications of their 
policies across all stages of the industry. 
We should emphasize that in order to attain 
broad coverage of the most salient lessons yet also 
be concise we are unable to go into the technical, 
financial and other types of detail that could be 
presented with a more narrow focus. In a sense, 
then, we deliberately eschew an analysis of each 
tree to provide a road map through the forest. 
However, at the same time that we present a 
broad ‘guidebook’ of lessons, we recognize, and 
indeed insist, that in practice different national 
situations call for different strategies. Therefore, 
all of the lessons we outline must be carefully 
crafted and selectively applied to the concrete 
conditions in each country. 
The core of this paper consists of four sections. 
The first three detail specific lessons for each of 
the three levels of the oil industry indentified 
above. Thus, we begin by addressing exploration 
and development issues, move on to procurement 
and supply, and then discuss refining and market- 
ing. The fourth section covers institutional and 
management issues that are common to all of the 
industry’s levels. We conclude the paper by 
concisely summarizing the most important lessons 
as a pragmatic guide for policy-makers. 
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2. EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
It is widely agreed that there are relatively 
favourable geological prospects for the discovery 
of petroleum in a number of developing countries 
outside OPEC, including those that are currently 
producers. However, the pace of investment in 
exploration and development activities in many of 
these countries has been sluggish, especially 
compared with more-traditional areas such as 
North America and the Middle East, and with 
some frontier areas such as the North Sea.2 
Several factors are responsible for this so-called 
‘drilling gap’. 
First. some host governments are offering 
exploration and development contractual 
arrangements that, given the structure of invest- 
ment payoffs in such projects, provide for an 
insufficient amount of financial risk-sharing with 
foreign investors (largely the IOCs), and this is 
deterring exploration. In short, some govern- 
ments tire shouldering too little of the risk. 
Economic theory indicates that investments in- 
volving parties that are risk-averse-a character- 
istic of both thc typical LDC host government and 
IOC-should be governed by flexible institutional 
arrangements that provide for risk-sharing, with 
the allocation of risk based upon each party’s 
ability to bear risk. Some host governments can 
bear more risk than is specified in the contracts 
they offer to foreign investors. All other things 
being equal, the level of foreign investment in 
exploration and development activity i5 likely to 
be enhanced where there is greater bearing of risk 
by government. 
Certainly. because risk-bearing abilities differ 
acrosh LDCs (due, for example, to differences in 
the degree of each country’s integration into 
international capital markets), a contractual 
arrangement that appropriately governs the 
allocation of the risks and rewards of exploration 
and development activity in one country may not 
do so in another. Thus, two countries that are 
equally promising geologically but have different 
capacities for bearing risk should probably offer 
different contractual arrangements to attract the 
same level of investment. There has been a 
substantial degree of uniformity in exploration 
and development contractual arrangements in 
many developing countries throughout the past 15 
years, perhaps brought about by some sort of 
‘demonstration effect’. There is little question 
that this uniformity is an important reason why 
there has been a relatively low level of explora- 
tion and development investment in some of 
these areas. 
Another set of factors that account for the 
relatively limited scope of exploration and de- 
velopment activity in LDCs concerns taxation. 
On one level the overall tax rate may be too high. 
However, there is an equally critical dimension of 
the relationship between taxation and exploration 
and development activity that needs to be taken 
into account: the structure of exploration and 
development tax rates across fields of varying 
size. It is well known that a progressive explora- 
tion and development tax structure-one in which 
tax rates rise with profitability-is an efficient 
taxation scheme because it does not impart a bias 
against exploiting small-volume, high-cost fields. 
Concisely, large, low-cost fields can support 
greater taxation than can small, high-cost fields. 
The latter type of field is likely to be the rule 
rather than the exception in most LDCs. 
Unfortunately, progressive exploration and de- 
velopment tax systems have not been adopted by 
many of these countries. There are at least two 
reasons for this. First, they tend to shift economic 
risk to the host government, which (possibly 
myopically) may be reticent to assume greater 
risk. Second, such tax regimes may also be risky 
politically for the government because petroleum 
tax revenues-which often rouse national feel- 
ings-usually do not begin to accrue substantially 
under such systems until a project is well under 
way and profitability rises to a predetermined 
‘windfall’ level. 
However, other changes in exploration and 
development tax arrangements, such as differen- 
tial royalties (for example, two-part 01- sliding- 
scale tariff types of regimes), have been instituted 
and have made small, high-cost fields in some 
countries more attractive to investors. There is, 
though, evidence which suggests that even these 
modifications do not go far enough and that most 
exploration and development tax systems in 
LDCs still discriminate against exploiting high- 
cost, small fields. 
It should be noted that having argued that 
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progressive exploration and development taxa- 
tion schemes are gcnerally the most efficient is 
not to suggest that all LDCs should adopt the 
same exploration and development tax system. 
Indeed, for the reasons alluded to above in the  
context of contractual arrangements, an explora- 
tion and development taxation scheme that is 
optimal for one country need not be optimal for 
another. 
Several lessons are suggested by this analysis of 
exploration and development problems in LDCs. 
On one level there needs to be a fundamental 
restructuring of exploration and development 
contractual and taxation terms for foreign inves- 
tors. In particular, these provisions must be 
revised to provide for a more balanced allocation 
of thc risk associated with the long-lived invest- 
ments they govern. On another level, in light of 
the recent emergence of volatility in oil prices, 
which is likely to be a fundamental characteristic 
of the world oil market for the forseeable future, 
these provisions must also be revised to be more 
market-sensitive. Moreover. arrangements for 
smoother flows of information between the con- 
tractor and the government should be devised, 
including information about prices, market de- 
mand and the availability of supplies. Finally, 
LDC governments should recognize that IOCs 
present opportunities (as well as risks) and that a 
symbiotic (or a positive-sum game) approach will 
be mutually benef i~ ia l .~  
3. PROCUREMENT AND SUPPLY 
The most critical issues related to procurement 
and supply concern the mechanisms that firms 
and governments employ to obtain the supplies of 
crude oil or refined products needed to meet 
demand in the local market. 
As is well known, most developing countries 
import all of their oil supplies. There are a few 
LDCs that produce petroleum but still import 
some percentage of their national requirements. 
A number of these producing-countries are like 
Zaire, which exports virtually its entire produc- 
tion because the domestic refinery is not designed 
to process the local grade of crude. Instead, Zaire 
imports crude that is compatible with its refinery. 
There are othcr LDC producers that are entirely 
crude-oil self-sufficient but must import a small 
perccntage of refined products to satisfy special 
markets needs not easily met by the configuration 
of domestic refineries. Thus, for most developing 
countries, even those that are oil producers, it is 
necessary to master the procurement and supply 
process. 
In one respect the procurement and supply area 
of the oil industry is often the most important 
economic activity in many developing countries. 
Imported oil generally constitutes the single 
largest item on  the national import bill and hence 
is the largest user of foreign exchange. This 
means that by pursuing efficient procurement and 
supply stratcgies LDC governments can mitigate 
large outflows of foreign exchange. 
The notion alluded to above that slow adapta- 
tion to changes in thc world oil market has 
imposed costs on LDCs is seen most vividly in the 
case of procurement and supply. Many LDCs 
have been tied to procurement and supply import 
contracts that are not price-sensitive and hence do 
not reflect the fall in oil prices that has occurred in 
the past several years. Contracts written when 
prices were at US $35 barrel-' continued even as 
spot-prices dropped below $30. Also, when spot 
prices fell to $20 and less. some countries were 
still paying contract prices of $27 or $28 barrel-'. 
In addition, contract financing terms were often 
disadvantageous and did not reflect markct 
changes, i.e. declines in interest rates. 
A rough calculation of the difference between 
what could have been paid on thc spot-market 
and what was actually paid under contract for 
crude and product imports for each of a variety of 
small, poor West African countries reveals a loss 
of almost $4 million year-'. Such losscs are not 
atypical for many LDCs. 
What lessons can LDC governments learn from 
these experienccs? In general, devising cost- 
effective procurement and supply strategies is 
critical even for countries that have significant 
local production. Discovering and producing oil 
in commercial quantities should not become an 
opportunity to pay less attention to procurement 
and supply policics. Particularly in today's mar- 
ket, virtually all LDCs must strengthen their 
capacity in this area. 
Let us be more specific. First, the importing 
government agency, usually the NOC, should 
avoid fixed-price contracts. While these arc 
attractive when oil prices are rising, they are a 
terrible liability when prices are falling. Clearly, 
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given the strength of oil price volatility, flexible 
contracts should be designed which use market- 
related pricing schemes that respond quickly to 
upward as well as downward trends in supply and 
demand. This will generally mean mastering 
knowledge of the spot-market and netback pric- 
ing schemes. In addition, it may also necessitate 
employing hedging techniques to insure against 
unexpected price movements. 
Second, LDC governments must obtain more 
information on new. more-flexible financing tech- 
niques available from multilateral institutions like 
the World Bank, or from private banks. They 
must also learn how to maximize the advantages 
of using such instruments through more- 
aggressive bargaining with these lenders. 
Finally, perhaps the most difficult lesson to put 
in practice: NOCs should try to devise pooled 
procurement and supply purchases, which can 
lever buying power and take advantage of econo- 
mies of scale in the market. Most easily organized 
through regional buying schemes, neighbouring 
countries can call for bids from IOCs and then 
make the contract award to the lowest bidder. 
There have been some efforts along these lines 
among some island states in the South Pacific. 
4. REFINING AND MARKETING 
Downstream refining and marketing are critical 
components of a national petroleum industry. 
Commercial success upstream in exploration and 
development does not change this important fact, 
it only complicates it. Indeed, wc would warn 
governments of newly producing LDCs not to let 
the excitement of joining the ranks of oil produc- 
ers blind them to the necessity of attentively 
managing downstream aspects of the industry. 
An important part of the recent structural 
changes in the world oil market is that refining 
and marketing have become profit centres in their 
own right.‘ Throughout most of the petroleum 
industry’s history, crude operations have been the 
most important commercially; thus, the shift 
downstream is quite significant. Many companies, 
from the established ‘majors’ to newer enterprises 
like Kuwait Petroleum Co. (KPC), have adjusted 
their corporate strategies to this new reality. With 
respect to the ‘majors’, a number of them have 
developed or expanded greatly separate trading 
units, for example, Gulf‘s GOTCO. KPC, on the 
other hand, has developed an extensive refining 
and distribution network through aggressive ac- 
quisition of assets to achieve a high degree of 
vertical integration. This is not to suggest that 
NOCs from newly producing LDCs should pursue 
identical strategies; indeed. such strategies are 
likely to be beyond their financial and managerial 
capabilities, at least initially. Rather, the point is 
that in devising petroleum development plans 
governments of new producers need to pay as 
much attention to downstream activities as to 
upstream activities, perhaps in national and fore- 
ign markets. What are some specific lessons that 
can guide decision-makers in this regard? 
4.1 REFINING 
In the 1960s a number of developing countries- 
producers as well as non-producers-built re- 
fineries in order to gain some of the value-added 
being earned by the integrated international oil 
companies. These investments, which were most 
pronounced in West Africa and Southeast Asia, 
as well as in India and Brazil, allowed for the 
importation of cheap crude oil instead of more- 
expensive refined products. The result was a 
significant savings in foreign exchange. Through- 
out the 1970s many of these projects continued to 
be profitable, although in some cases, where 
domestic market changes produced a gap be- 
tween the level and nature of end-use demand 
and the scale and process configuration of refiner- 
ies, losses resulted. However, in today’s market, 
with crude and product prices highly variable and 
with increasing reliance on netback pricing 
schemcs, the profit margins on most of these 
investments have been reduced. As a result 
devising an appropriate refinery strategy has 
become more challenging. For the smallest and 
least efficient refineries, the least-cost option is 
perhaps obvious: simply dismantle the facilities 
and rely instead on the growing supplies of 
inexpensive product flowing out of the new 
export-oriented refineries in the Middle East. 
However, for other facilities, and thus more 
generally, what should be done? Essentially three 
options exist: (a) build new (state-of-the art) 
refineries; (b) rationalize and upgrade existing 
facilities; or (c) mothball the facilities and tem- 
porarily meet demand through product imports. 
No single option, of course, is universally superior 
to the other two. Because each demand and 
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supply situation is different from country to 
country, governments must embark on  a refinery 
strategy that best meets local conditions. In some 
cases there is a great need for flexibility, so a mix 
of these options-where possible-is optimal. 
We should note here an important implication 
of the changes in the structure of domestic 
demand that many LDCs have been experiencing 
in the past decade. Demand in most of these 
countries is shifting decisively toward middle 
distillates such as kerosene and automobile fuel. 
However, as refinery output is raised to increase 
the production of middle distillates, large 
amounts of fuel oil, for which there is insufficient 
domestic demand, are also produced. While the 
surplus is exported, because fuel oil typically is a 
low-value product: the overall profitability of 
refining operations is lower than it  would be if the 
process configuration better matched the struc- 
ture of demand. 
NOC management, whose main task may be to 
operate the national refinery, is likely to balk at 
policies requiring refinery closure, and may well 
be unwilling to make the transition to function 
simply as a monitor of imports. Even if there is a 
recommendation to open up the domestic refining 
market to imports only partially, NOC manage- 
ment is likely to resist. However, government 
leaders should exercise the willpower to insist 
that, at a minimum, the NOC should be subjected 
to competitive pressure. Experiences abound 
which demonstrate that exposing the national 
refining market to import competition helps to 
hold down consumer prices and reduces ineffi- 
ciencies in NOC management. 
All of these issues become technically and 
politically more complex with the advent of 
domestic production in the country. The more 
production there is, the greater the pressure to 
build or expand local refining capacity. The 
appropriate decision in this regard, however, can 
only be reached after analysis of the various 
options. At one extreme, for a country with 
relatively large production capacity and a re- 
latively large domestic market, refinery construc- 
tion probably makes sense. At the other extreme, 
for a country with low production and a small 
market, investment in refining may be unneces- 
sary and therefore costly; instead, i t  may be more 
economical to export all of the crude and use the 
foreign exchange that is earned to finance product 
imports-as occurs, for example, in Zaire. 
4.2 MARKETING 
In terms of marketing (i.e. retail distribution of 
refined products to consumers and businesses), 
LDC governments today need to foster more 
market-sensitive pricing policies. Political and 
social pressures to subsidize rural populations 
often lead to a unified price scheme that does not 
accurately reflect marginal production and 
marketing costs. The central issue here is whether 
the gains in distributional equity outweigh the 
losses in efficiency. 
Domestic oil prices worldwide have always 
been, and will probably continue to be, politically 
sensitive. This is especially true in developing 
countries, where governments have historically 
responded to local pressures to regulate or 
subsidize energy prices. LDC energy pricing 
policies typically incorporate cross-subsidization 
across fuels. For example, kerosene is frequently 
sold below market-clearing prices, while gasoline 
is usually taxed. Such schemes are designed with 
the objective of benefiting the poorest segments 
of society. However, because commercial energy 
use rises significantly with income, in the aggre- 
gate petroleum subsidies tend to benefit the 
middle class far more than the poor. Neverthe- 
less, subsidization policies remain. 
Indeed, the practice of politicizing retail pet- 
roleum prices is widespread in LDCs. This is 
especially true in countries with production. 
Consumers in these countries insist that oil is part 
of their national patrimony, that it is nearly free 
and, consequently, that its price should be heavily 
subsidized. Such arguments should be resisted by 
governments. In case after case it has been shown 
that artificially low downstream prices produce 
distortions in other segments of these countries’ 
oil markets, and in their energy markets overall. 
They may also produce deleterious consequencies 
for macro-economic performance. For example, 
because artificially low oil prices increase local 
consumption, they lower the volume of pet- 
roleum available for export, and thereby depress 
potential export earnings. 
We are aware of-indeed sympathetic to-the 
need for government to offset the negative effects 
of high energy prices on the poor. Given the 
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distortions and ineffectiveness of subsidies, 
however, we prefer trying to accomplish this 
objective through lump-sum payments (either in 
cash or in kind) targeted directly at  the groups in 
need. 
4.2.1 Overseas marketing: a special case 
Some new LDC producers may be blessed with 
petroleum resources that are larger than domestic 
demand. In these cases the question arises of 
what sales mechanism will maximize exports. 
Throughout the history of the modern pet- 
roleum industry virtually all companies-both 
IOCs and NOCs alike-have sought innovative 
ways to market oil internationally. In thc 1980s 
the newest marketing institution in the crude-oil 
end of the business is netback pricing (used 
perhaps most effectively by Saudi Arabia). A 
netback price is the refined-product value of a 
barrel of crude less the processing and other 
costs. By shifting the price risk upstream, i.e. 
away from customers, and making price more 
responsive to changes in end-use demands, such a 
scheme allows producers to penetrate more effec- 
tively the international crude sales market, While 
netback pricing cannot (and should not) be 
practised by all producers-because the burden of 
shouldering price risk may be too costly for some 
countrics-there is a general lesson here: some 
type of systematic market-based export pricing 
strategy needs to be devised by NOC manage- 
ment. No longer can oil sellers rely on buyers 
beating down the door. Prices must be set in a 
competitive fashion in order to attract premium 
buyers. This new marketing imperative is the 
other side of the coin of the new exploration and 
development imperative to design market- 
sensitive contractual and taxation schemes that 
were outlined abovc. 
5 .  INSTITUTIONAL AND MANAGEMENT 
ISSUES 
Institutional and management issues run through 
all three functional areas that we have analysed 
above. By institutional and management issues 
we mean the  core activities associated with 
determining priorities, designing strategies and 
implementing policies that governments must 
perform. In this regard the operational lessons to 
be learned here are perhaps the most important. 
We would like to draw attention to three major 
institutional and management concerns: (a) 
balancing NOC autonomy and control; (b) foster- 
ing competition in the domestic market; and (c) 
co-ordinating upstream and downstream activi- 
ties. 
5.1 BALANCING NOC AUTONOMY AND CONTROL 
The lessons to be learned here are essentially 
those of all public enterprises, especially large 
parastatals that produce (or buy) goods traded in 
international markets. Perhaps the single most 
common feature shared by successful public 
enterprises is their autonomy from detailed and 
ex ante controls by civil servants in central 
ministries. NOCs which have exhibited strong 
economic performance and have made substantial 
contributions to national energy well-being tend 
to be those that have been given considerable 
authority by government to set (domestic and 
international) prices; to set terms for the hiring, 
firing and rewarding of personnel; and to deter- 
mine investment priorities. 
Another important lesson is that LDC NOCs at 
all levels of the industry must learn how to 
negotiate more efficiently with their private- 
sector suppliers, customers and, where present, 
their competitors. A common perception among 
NOC managcment who interact and negotiate 
with IOCs is that at every turn the IOCs try to 
keep the government in the dark. Clearly, the 
history of the international oil industry offers 
numerous examples of lOCs trying to hoodwink 
LDC governments, or worse. At the same time 
interviews with industry officials, and the con- 
fidential records of others, indicate that one of 
the most frequently voiced complaints that lead 
IOCs to consider very carefully whether to invest 
(or reinvest) in an LDC is whether the NOC 
officials in that country are seen as knowledge- 
able, competent and enjoy the confidence of 
government leaders. If they do not, the worry is 
that a contract negotiated on very favourable 
terms may be abrogated in mid-stream when a 
ncw official comes on board.’ 
Financial autonomy is the area where many of 
these issues are most clearly seen. In some 
countries the national oil company has its hands 
tied because it is subject to  the same bureaucratic 
regulation as other public enterprises; yet the 
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NOC’s needs are quite different given the 
strategic position of oil in the economy. For 
example, the government may set spending limits 
on the NOC’s expenditures; it also may require 
several levels of ministerial officials to sign off on 
an NOC contract. In one instance that we 
observed, a procurement and supply import 
contract was almost lost because the chairman of 
the central bank was out of the country and only 
he could sign off on the $25 million payment. The 
obvious lesson here is that governments must give 
their NOCs a sufficient degree of autonomy. 
Government should set the general priorities and 
guidelines, but it should stay out of the NOC’s 
daily operational issues; it will attain sufficient 
influence in that sphere through its power on the 
board of directors and by exercising its authority 
to name top management. 
5.2 FOSTEKING COMPETITIVENESS 
The standard remedy for poor NOC performance 
was once routinely given as ‘more autonomy’. 
However, as more evidence has become avail- 
able, it turns out that more autonomy is only half 
of the cure; the other half is ’more competition’. 
Government needs to devise policies that provide 
NOCs with autonomy but also foster competitive- 
ness in their pricing and investment decisions.6 
It is well known that in strategic sectors like oil. 
governments worldwide have often been reluc- 
tant to permit much competition. This has been 
especially true in smaller countries with pro- 
nounced national security concerns. Of course, in 
most LDCs the inability (or unwillingness) to rely 
on the ’invisible hands’ and thus the use of 
protectionist measures pertains to other, non-oil 
sectors as well. In oil, many LDC governments 
fear the long arm of the IOCs or the  threatening 
touch of local businessmen, and are loath to 
permit competition with the NOC. Nevertheless, 
in case after case the evidence suggests that by 
subjecting NOCs to competitive pressure econo- 
mic welfare is greatly enhanced. This is as true in 
the downstream portion of LDCs’ oil sectors as it  
is in the upstream portion. 
5.3 CO-ORDINATION STRATEGIES 
Throughout this paper we have stressed the 
importance of the interconnectedness of the 
various levels that comprise an LCD’s oil sector. 
We have also alluded to the importance of the 
interconnectedness between oil and other energy 
sectors. In these two regards several lessons 
should be noted. 
To take the second aspect first, LDC govern- 
ments should develop policies that promote com- 
petition between oil and other fuels. This usually 
requires eliminating subsidies on particular fuels 
and allowing-indeed fostering-the configura- 
tion of relative prices to match marginal social 
costs. Certainly, achieving distributional equity is 
just as important as achieving efficient pricing. 
However, as was argued above, meeting the 
equity objective is often better addressed using 
policy instruments outside the price system per 
se. With socially efficient pricing policies in place, 
energy demand will be more elastic and the 
prospects for interfuel substitution will be en- 
hanced. This means that the typical LDC eco- 
nomy will be more resilient to the price shocks 
that have become the hallmark of the world oil 
market. In addition, it will mean increased 
incentives for investment in conservation pro- 
jects, both in households and in industry. 
There are two major points that should be 
made regarding the interrelationships among the 
oil sector’s stages. One concerns the optimal level 
of government involvement in each stage. 
Whether such involvement occurs through state 
ownership or regulatory oversight, it is often less 
justified in exploration and development, refining 
and retailing activities than it is in the transport 
and distribution stages, where market failure. 
(i.e. natural monopoly) arises because of inherent 
technological factors. The other issue concerns 
government policies that maximize the efficien- 
cies of integrating upstream and downstream 
activities. The role of government here is to 
promote vertical integration up the point where 
the economies of joint ownership of successive 
stages of production (e.g. refining and pipelining) 
are just exhausted. This will enchance the ability 
of price signals to be efficiently transmitted 
between points of consumption and production, 
and thus balance upstream supply with down- 
stream demand. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In the foregoing we have raised many issues that 
LDC governments should consider in devising 
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their petroleum development strategies. The Refining and marketing 
principal lessons that emerge from our analysis Do not overbuild; L D C  governments should 
can be summarized in t h c  following way. consider carefully the ‘buy versus build’ trade- 
off. Exploration and development 
0 Host governments should lessen onerous con- 
tractual and fiscal terms for foreign investors 
(i.e. IOCs), and makc them more flexible. 
Financial provisions should be devised which 
yield a more efficient allocation of risks. 
Arrangements for smoother flows of informa- 
tion between NOCs and IOCs should be 
devised, including information about priccs, 
s u u ~ l v  and demand, and transfers of tech- 
D o  not overemploy. 
* Maintain flexible refining capabilities in light 
of the increased volatility in both supply and 
demand of crudesiproducts of various qual- 
ities. 
Permit greater competition from imports in 
order to hold down ex-refinery prices. 
Facilitate efficient and price-sensitive distribu- 
tion networks. .. , 
nology. Institutional and management issues 
present opportunitics not just risks, and that a 
symbiotic (or a positive-sum game) approach 
will be most beneficial to all parties. 
Host governments should recognize that IOCs L D C  governments should provide for in- 
creased opcrating autonomy of their NOCs; 
5pccifically. in decisions regarding capital in- 
vestment, pricing, personnel and negotiations - .  
(with IOCs). 
0 Improve NOCs capital structure (i.e. debt- 
equity ratio) in order to attract financing more 
cheaply. 
Government should encourage competition in 
each segment of the country’s petroleum 
industry, including the elimination of sanc- 
tioned monopolies. 
0 Devise policies to co-ordinate upstream and 
downstream sectors; e.g. dcvelop integration 
strategies. 
Procurement and supply 
0 NOCs should avoid fixed-price contracts. 
0 Use market-related pricing schemes, e.g. net- 
back provisions. 
0 Adopt hedging techniques, i.e. learn how to 
use the spot and future markets. 
0 Take advantage of new financing opportuni- 
ties from both private and public sources. 
Devise pooled transactional arrangements, 
e.g. sellers’ or buyers’ co-operatives. 
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